The Iranian Parliamentary Elections and US-Iran Relations 

 Hooshang Amir Ahmadi*

The Iranian conservatives have won the parliamentary elections. Some called it a coup as candidates were screened and votes rigged. President Bush expressed disappointment and sent a supportive message to the Iranian people. Ironically, those who express the deepest regret at the results are the same people who boycotted the elections and made every effort to discredit the reformers. It is like shooting a victim and then crying for the dead.

While the elections process was deplorable, the results should not be hastily dismissed. Fifty percent of the 46 million eligible to vote participated, the lowest participation rate of any of the six previous parliamentary elections. Of those who participated, about 15 percent voted blank. Large cities like Tehran, Isfahan, Mashhad and Tabriz showed a participation rate of about 30 percent.  Most votes were collected from smaller towns and villages, where local, ethnic, and tribal differences are often translated into election contests.

A so-called “rationalist” faction among the conservatives, referring to themselves as “the Developmentalists” (Abadgaran), won most seats. Many of them are religious layman and technocrats who like to be viewed as largely non-political. They are the Leader Ali Khamanei’s alternative to the original, and now largely undermined, “pragmatist” Servants of Reconstruction (Kargozaran-e Sazandegi), who formed around former President Hashemi Rafsanjani.

The Developmentalists, who already control many of the local councils and the Tehran municipality, are better defined as a transitional social group within the conservative movement. They are a hybrid nativist group with roots in the bazaar, neither modern nor traditional, and their ultimate loyalty to fundamentalism and theocracy is suspect. They hold an unsophisticated view of Iran’s international and domestic challenges, despite the fact that many among them hold doctorate degrees.

The winners now have to deal with both opponents and supporters in a generally dissatisfied large population besieged with declining real income, administrative corruption and social ills like crime and addiction. The poor want their basic needs addressed, the educated groups require freedoms, the wealthy demand a secure business climate, the young people want jobs, and women demand equal rights. They must also deal with the expatriates crying for lost national pride and the separatist calls among certain ethnic groups, and strike a balance between the modern and traditional forces.

Meanwhile, they must respond to the multiple concerns of the United States and Europe. These include weapons of mass destruction, currently focused on the nuclear technology question, terrorism in its all forms and against all nations, Israel in particular, and the peace in the Middle East. Human rights have become an increasingly bigger concern but for the moment it has taken a back seat to the nuclear and terrorism issues. The good news is that these matters are all negotiable but the real problem has ever been to find the right roadmap.

The Abadgaran are expected to make similar mistakes as the reformists and pragmatists. The middle class reformists claimed that political development was the key to Iran’s ills. As a consequence, they neglected to address economic development and social justice. Before them, the pragmatists had determined that the entry point to Iran’s ills were economic, a mistake that essentially forced them out of power. The Abadgaran seem to think more like the pragmatists with a small propaganda dose of social justice. 

Only a coalition of the Iranian entrepreneurs, the middle class and the working people, along with other civil and political groups, and the international democratic community, can address these problems, but such a coalition will remain a distant dream. Even within the conservatives in power, who include the clergy, the strategically positioned state bureaucrats, and the big merchants, a united front cannot emerge. In post-elections Iran, a major fault line will develop between the transitional and fundamentalist factions.  

The anticipated friction within the conservatives could ultimately tilt the balance in favor of the transitional faction if the pro-democracy front and the United States were to map out an approach to the regime in Tehran that would co-opt rather than isolate the fundamentalist faction. The name of the game is “engagement” but one that would, over time, weaken the political power of the fundamentalists while empowering the rest. How might this be achieved?

The reformists, largely the middle class intelligentsia, must now be content with loss of power, join forces with other democratic groups, and begin the hard work of organizing the disenfranchised civil society. They must also acknowledge the needs of the Iranian entrepreneurs, in an attempt to build a broader coalition and a more powerful economic base. The pro-democracy groups must also loudly support the normalization of relations with the United States.

US-Iran hostility remains the key challenge of democracy and development in Iran. Anti-American nations have never opted for democratization. More than 75 percent of Iranians view the normalization of relations with the United States as the best thing for their national interest. They know well that the lack of relations has cost them huge material and political loses as well as a decline in international prestige.

The American national interest would also be well served by the normalization of relations with Iran. In the past 25 years, when the two countries have had no diplomatic relations, every American administration has acknowledged the strategic, economic, and cultural significance of Iran. But they have also underscored their concerns regarding Iran’s behavior in variety of strategic, political and human rights areas. 

The good news is that the environment of US-Iran relations is slowly but surely changing in a positive direction. Iran helped the United States fight al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein. Tehran has also generously contributed to the Iraqi and Afghan reconstruction funds. Iran must further help the United States and others in eradicating terrorism in all its forms and against all nations, and assist to end violence in Iraq and the Palestinian-Israeli territories.

Iran is now cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but the revelations coming out of Iran regarding its nuclear activities remain a problem. Iran will likely shy away from a Libyan approach to the nuclear issue but “disclose when you are caught lying” approach will not work either. It will further damage Iran’s credibility and call into question its commitment to remain within the bounds of peaceful use of nuclear technology. A more transparent approach is required if Americans and Europeans were to help Iran resolve the dispute.

The Bush Administration has on more than one occasion acknowledged the positive contributions of Iran to American wars in the region and Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA. President Bush welcomed Iran’s signing of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol as “a very positive development,” and responded generously to the Bam disaster and offered a high-level delegation to visit the country. Indeed, rhetoric aside, the Bush Administration has taken no significant practical steps to further isolate Iran.

Twice in recent months the United States had the opportunity to isolate Iran but on both occasions at the IAEA it sided with the European states -- dropped threatening languages from the resolutions, toned down its criticisms of Iran’s nuclear activities, and even agreed to praise Iran for cooperation. Another highly significant of a sea-state change in US-Iran front was the unexpected approval of the Iraq-Iran pipeline in early March by the Coalition Provisional Authority.

The elections now provide a new window of opportunity for US-Iran engagement. The transitional conservatives are expected to consolidate power by taking the presidency when President Khatami’s term ends next August. They are also expected to insist on relaxing social restrictions, pouring billions of saved dollars from the oil revenue into the economy, and moderating foreign policy. They will also be prepared to hold dialogue with the United States, if approached properly.

A US-Iran engagement will weaken the fundamentalists while strengthening the position of the transitional groups and pro-democracy and pragmatic forces within and without the government. As the elections also indicate well, most Iranians do not want a violent regime change though many yearn for democratic transformation. Diplomacy and trade builds respect for human rights and freedoms, rightly asserted Secretary of State Colin Powell in a recent speech on US foreign policy.

Those who think engagement with the Iranian conservatives is not good for democracy there or for the United Sates’ national interest must also consider this: in the last 25 years, or so, some 30 dictatorships have made transition to democracies. They all had diplomatic and trade relations with the United States. In contrast, dictatorships with no diplomatic ties with the United States, and under its economic sanctions, remain in place.

But the unique Iranian situation requires that the terms of the engagement must also be unique. Given the mistrust on both sides, the engagement must begin with building trust between the two governments regarding their intentions. One sure measure towards this end is simultaneous announcements that, under certain conditions, Tehran and Washington will be prepared to engage with the intention of normalizing relations.

Another tool of confidence building is a reciprocal acceptance of interests and roles. Tehran must acknowledge the legitimate American global interests and role. The United States should do likewise with regard to Iran’s regional interests and role. This reciprocity should not infringe upon the legitimate interests and roles of other states. Cooperation is the key to regional trust building and security.

Misperception has been at the root of mutual demonization and deception. To help build trust, both sides must broaden their perspectives of each other’s concerns, deeds, intentions and capabilities. Iran must stop seeing the United States as a sworn enemy of Iran. True, Americans helped the British in the 1953 coup, but Americans have also contributed to the Iranian overall development.

American officials have stressed Iran’s strategic significance, but this is often done to underscore its potential for aggression. The presumption that “a weaker Iran is a better Iran” was the basis of the “dual containment” policy. Yet, in the last 150 years, or so, a strong Iran has never initiated any hostility toward its neighbors. A strong Iran, in partnership with the United States, can indeed become a pivot of regional stability. Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood and has legitimate defense needs.

The common interests of the United State and Iran far outweigh their differences. This has not often been acknowledged or used to develop a common purpose and action plan to fight terrorism and moderate Islamic fundamentalism, eliminate weapons of mass destruction, advance the Middle East peace, institutionalize a regional security system, stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, ensure the safe flow of oil from the region, and improve governance and human rights in the region. At stake is also the stability and sustainable independence of the states in the Central Asia and Caucasus.

The situation in Iraq and the proximity of American and Iranian forces in the region, particularly in the Islamic Afghanistan and Iraq, provides additional strategic imperative for the two governments to work cooperatively.  Stable Iraq and Afghanistan are in the best interest of both countries, and Iran can help to positively influence the situation in both countries as it has influence among key Shiite and other leaders there. The United States must give Iran the opportunity to do so and then reward it for its cooperation.

Under no condition should US-Iran engagement overlook Iran’s dismal human rights records or weaken its pro-democracy movement. US pressure on Tehran to observe its constitutional and international obligations must increase as the two sides open dialogue and cooperate on specific matters. There is no alternative to Iran becoming a democratic nation. Allowing American NGOs and civil society activists to operate freely in Iran, and relaxing visa restrictions on their Iranian counterparts will be most helpful and popular.

Iran should not become another Iraq or Cuba for the United States. The national interests of neither side would be served by such eventualities. The American policy toward former Soviet bloc and South Africa, for example, provides a more effective alternative. The next months before the presidential elections in the United States are critical. The conditions are better, a strategic imperative exists, and both sides need each other as never before. An “October surprise” is by no means unthinkable.

Hooshang Amirahmadi

Princeton, March 2004

* Hooshang Amirahmadi is a Professor and Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at Rutgers University, and President of American Iranian Council (www.american-iranian.org). Office: 609-252-9099; Mobile: 609-937-6488; Fax: 609-279-9889. E-mail: hooshang@amirahmadi.com. 

Contact us at:

Jomhouri- DC (EJI) 

P. O. Box 813 Herndon, VA 20172 USA

Fax: (1) 703- 991- 3059

Or in Europe: 

P.O. Box. 94638, 1090 GP Amsterdam, Holland 

Fax: (31)-20-774 66 03

Send mail to international@jomhouri.com with questions or comments about this web site.
Copyright © 2004 Ettehad-e Jomhourikhahan-e Iran
Last modified: June 26, 2004