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Good Governance and Human Security in the Caspian Region
Lecture Presented at the Conference on Caucus,
Caspian and Central Asia: Maritime Dimensions of Security
May 14-16, 2004. Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Hooshang Amirahmadi, Rutgers University
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good morning! Let me begin by saying how honored I am to
have been invited to speak at this distinguished gathering of experts on Caspian
security. I want to thank David Griffths of the Center for Foreign Policy
Studies (of Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada) and Amir
Mohagheghi of the Cooperative Monitoring Center (of the Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, USA) for the invitation and joint sponsorship of this
rather timely conference. After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the
Caspian region has taken a back seat to the Middle East, where the United States
has focused its war against terrorism, the former Iraqi regime, and now the
religious and nationalist Iraqi rebels. Yet the Caspian region and its security
are no less important to global peace, regional stability, and American
security.
Equally important is the security of the Caspian region for
its own people, particularly if viewed from a multidimensional perspective,
involving human-social, military-strategic, resource-economic,
marine-environment, geopolitics-boundaries, and emergency-management security
issues. In this lecture, however, I wish to focus my talk on “good governance
and human security in the Caspian region,” covering the five littoral states:
Iran, Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan. I shall
begin with an outline of my conceptual thinking on the subject and then apply
the framework to the real situation in the countries. Except as otherwise
specified, the statistics I refer to in the lecture are for 2001 and taken from
the Human Development Report 2003 of the United Nation Development Programs (HUR
2003, UNDP).
For
centuries, the Caspian region was the strategic crossroads for the empires of
Europe, Asia, and Africa. Control of its vital land and water routes,
particularly for the spice trade, assured great power and wealth; it also
invited rivalry – “the Great Game.” During the Cold War, ideological
confrontations were added to the geopolitical allure of the area, causing the
region to serve as a fault line in the East-West struggle.
Now that technological changes have diminished the significance of its
trade routes and the Cold War has ended, the control of the region's rich
hydrocarbon resources has become the focus of international business and
political players -- the region has once again become a pivotal frontier.
However,
it is a frontier vastly different from that of the past. History teaches us that
while new frontiers bring significant dangers, they also generate opportunities
for progress. The disappearance of the Soviet Union prompted regional and
outside players to expand their influence in the region – a game characterized
by gross shortsightedness with respect to the people in the region and their
needs for good governance and human security. Governance - the way society
collectively solves its problems and meets its needs, and human security - human
rights and human capacity development, are the most critical challenges that the
littoral states must meet in order to advance their societies in the global
community.
Governance and
Security Requirements of the New World
Till the end of the Cold
War, security was understood in largely political and military terms as it was
defined by the state for the protection of its national territory and control of
its people. As such, neither human security nor governance were central to the
security debates. Both were submerged under the rubric of national sovereignty
and territorial integrity – the two most sacred defensive functions of the
nation-state in the Cold War era. This political concept of security was partly
influenced by the American experience, where early theories of international
security were developed. Emergence of a democratic-imperial capitalist America,
in parallel with the emergence of the Soviet Union as another world power of a
“social-imperialist” dictatorial nature, was the key factor.
But the bi-polar, state-centric world, which gave birth to
this concept of security, has largely disappeared: the ambitious tightly knit
USSR has been partially replaced with a loose and largely timid Commonwealth of
Independent Countries (CIS), and Western Europe has gained relative political
autonomy from the United States in international relations. Even Japan now has
become politically assertive in global matters. One consequence of this is that
a new world has emerged where the state is no more the only player and security
is no longer only the state’s business. Specifically, in the current
tri-centric world where the state is challenged by multinational corporations
and civil society groups, a new concept of security is emerging where governance
and human security are the key concepts alongside the old concept of state
security.
Prior to World War II, the concept of security was
dominated by liberal ideas, which gave prominence to legal arguments and state
preference, as opposed to capabilities, and tended to view international
relations in optimistic terms. In the post-World War II, that is in the Cold War
environment, realists, and then neo-realists, took over the security field and
placed state power in the center of their new constructs as a means of
regulating an otherwise anarchic international system. Security then emerged as
a field preoccupied with constraining the power of other sovereign states and
non-state actors through military deterrence and containment. But pre-emption, a
concept central to the current Bush doctrine, was not allowed. The current
United States defense strategy has gone even beyond pre-emption, in practice
becoming a prevention strategy.
The Vietnam War helped to weaken the realists and increase
the predominance of critical theories in security and international relations.
The road was then opened to new ideas, some of which, like deconstructionism and
post-modernism, begin to question the ideological basis and assumptions of
political security as a means of state domination. The state was also rejected
as the only unit of world security. It was argued that the Hobbsian view of the
individual as inherently ruthless and self-driven is contrary to human
experience and must thus be rejected. This cultural approach was complemented by
the globalization debate, arguing that it has empowered the transnational
corporations in international relations. Humanizing the individual, recognizing
the corporate players, and limiting the sovereign privilege of the state meant
that the old state-centric security concepts were no longer valid in the
emerging post-Cold War world.
The international system is now viewed as having three
groups of stakeholders: the state, the multinational corporation, and the
individual. This latter in turn was considered as having a three-dimensional
existence: member of the human race, self, and citizen (civil society actor as
well). Only this last dimension was recognized by the old state-centric security
concept: that state security also meant in a sense the security of its citizens,
who were considered anarchical and assumed to have contradictory (national)
interests to those of citizens in other states.
Here, citizens are territorially bound within a sovereign entity – the
nation-state. Individual as a member of the human race or as self was considered
irrelevant and in fact anti-security.
Expanding the rights of the individual beyond citizenship
rights and accounting for the corporate players meant that a new approach was
also needed to conceptualize the way societies were governed, namely a
governance model. The old concept held that citizens have governing rights but
have, under democracies, bestowed that right to their state. In dictatorships,
it was held that such rights are usurped by the state. But as far as security
was concerned, the state represented its respective citizens in both cases, and
the representation was legitimate to the extent that the state did indeed
provide the required strategic security. In other words, the protective state,
democratic or otherwise, had an inalienable sovereign right to security.
Governance, the way society collectively solves its
problems and meets its needs, requires public participation, decentralization
and partnership among the state, the civil society and the corporate sector.
The key concept of partnership in turn involves or enhances consultation,
cooperation and coordination across functional (sectoral) and territorial
(spatial) units of the nation-state. Governance
is, thus, a more integrated approach to decision-making, development planning,
and societal management. It improves transparency, accountability and social
inclusion, and thus results in societal cohesiveness. More importantly, the
model fits the tri-centric world of the state, the civil society and the
corporate sector.
The governance model is, thus, only possible under a
democratic state or at the least a state that is prepared to recognize the
rights of its citizens beyond the ordinary citizenship rights to include rights
they are entitled to as individuals and members of the human race. These rights
include human rights as defined in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and human development as outlined in the UN Millennium Development Goals.
Included in these documents are political, economic, social, cultural,
territorial, institutional, spiritual, ideological, and informational needs and
aspirations. From this perspective, states are classified as high, medium, and
low human development achievers.
Besides these changes, globalization has also resulted in a
number of significant developments, the most important of which are the
emergence of issues that are both threats and panaceas to the security concerns
of the state, the individual, and the corporation. These include terrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, HIV/AIDS, drug trafficking and addiction,
environmental degradation, poverty, corruption, and heightened trans-border
traffic of people and commodities. For example, the Afghan opium trade is a
major security concern for Iran but a security panacea for Afghan cultivators;
and corruption in Caspian states is a major means of wealth accumulation but
threatens the social fabric of the nations. The emergence of issues as security
factors adds the concern of dealing with non-state actors, who are often not
bound to any particular territory. Terrorism is, evidently, a case in point.
Globalization, by making peoples and states more
interdependent has increased poverty and income inequality though it had the
potential to reduce them. Globalization
has particularly endangered the security of the smaller developing countries
whose governments are slow to adapt to technological and societal changes, and
who have more difficulty seeing beyond short-term financial interests toward the
long-term health of their peoples. Competing for international resources can be
a dangerous proposition for the poorer states, as they already are facing
tremendous challenges in managing their debts and fueling sustainable growth.
More critically, their relative poverty in the absence of appropriate
governance makes them highly exploitable by multinational corporations. In
addition, competition among nations to attract foreign investment leads to a
lack of taxation, labor law, and environmental protection.
Another critical feature of the new tri-centric world
system is a built-in tension in its drive for simultaneous stability and chaos,
a development that has followed the emergence of a global civil society of
global actors and constituencies, and thus global accountability and common
vulnerability. In particular, the
system is caught between two diametrically opposing tendencies, one calling for
integration and cooperation and the other creating conditions for disintegration
and conflict. Let us call these
influences world-integrating forces and world-disintegrating forces. Broadly
speaking, world-integrating forces include the corporate sector and
technological forces, while disintegrative forces are comprised of
interventionist states and certain non-state fundamentalist actors such as
terrorist organizations and ethnic separatist movements.
There are many ramifications of the contradictory tendencies for
integration and disintegration; the one I believe is most pivotal for a new
paradigm of global security and coexistence is the diminishing utility of
illegitimate power and offensive force, including militarism and violence, the
so-called “hard power,” in gaining societal hegemony or maintaining a
popularly undesirable status quo. As the power of offensive force has
diminished, particularly when used unilaterally and preventively, economic force
and information technologies, along with other components of so-called “soft
power,” have become the most effective means of influence and domination.
Indeed, Japan and Germany have grown into powerful international forces
almost entirely because of their economic strength and information-processing
capabilities. In the absence of an expansive “soft power,” no amount of
“hard power” may be exercised to gain dominance, legitimacy, or democracy.
In the tri-centric world, military power is not the most effective way of
providing security for a country. The United Nations Development Forum says
“the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily
lives. Future conflicts may often
be within nations rather than between them—with their origins buried deep in
growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development,
not in arms.” It will be
impossible for a developing nation to make progress towards such goals as peace,
development, environmental protection, human rights, and democratization without
attending first to the sustainable development of its people’s capacities. The
lack of human security, a universal issue now, is one of the causes of national
discord, and can lead to multinational military conflicts. These conflicts can
be prevented by meeting threats to human security before they become larger and
more violent problems.
With the growing recognition of economics and information technologies as
fields of force, and thus means of security, the state has come under increasing
pressure to show performance in these areas. This demand is particularly
significant in the context of the increasing rights of individuals and
corporations. Significantly, under the new condition, totalitarian and
authoritarian regimes are increasingly forced to accept the legitimate rights of
their human and corporate elements, and become accountable to national and
global societies. Indeed, the state is viewed as legitimate only to the extent
that it is acceptably developmental and democratic. Otherwise, they are
considered failed states; such states are increasingly barred from claiming
sovereignty, a concept that has increasingly become people-centered.
Experience and Challenges of the Littoral Caspian States
How have the littoral Caspian states fared in the
tri-centric world, and what challenges do they face in security and governance?
The answer to this question must naturally recognize the significant differences
that exist among them in relation to their geography, population, resources
endowment, historic and cultural significance, and regional and international
relations and standing. Iran and the Russian Federation, for example, have
bigger economies and larger populations, and are far more developed, wealthier,
and better placed strategically than Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Nevertheless, they suffer from common problems and enjoy similar advantages.
Iran and Russia should have been major regional
integrationist forces given their vast and strategic geographies and
populations. In reality, however, they are only marginally influential in their
region and are often seen as siding with disintegrative forces. Iran-US conflict
and US- Russia competition are key obstacles to the potentials these countries
have to assume a more active and effective role in various regional matters. For
example, Iran and Russia only play peripheral roles in mediating regional
conflicts, such as that between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as they themselves have
unresolved conflicts with some states or ethnic groups at home or in the region.
And, more significantly, the states still need to find a solution to the problem
of the Caspian Sea legal regime.
Iran’s international political challenges include
allegations regarding state terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Both these
allegations are directed at the Iranian state, while terrorism in most nations
is a non-state phenomenon. Russia, on the other hand, is a nuclear state and
likes to view itself as a victim of Chechen terrorism. Yet, Russia refuses to
actively engage itself in the so-called American war against terrorism, viewing
the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq as largely rooted in the American desire to
dominate the region. The other
Caspian states are largely viewed as irrelevant to the terrorism and nuclear
issues, but also have their own international challenges. For example, the
dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia remains a time
bomb, and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan need to settle claims over fields in the
Caspian Sea.
Domestic politics are almost equally problematic in all five Caspian
states. Iran and Russia are authoritarian states that allow dissent but also
repress opposition selectively. They divide the population into conformists and
nonconformists, allowing freedom to the former while restricting the rights of
the latter in significant ways. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, on the
other hands, are totalitarian states where elections are disallowed or allowed
only as an international public relations ploy. In all these states candidates
for public offices are vetted, overtly or covertly, and elections are rigged.
Kazakhstan is not a signatory to the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (1966) and the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (1966), while Iran has refused to sign the UN Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment and Punishment
(1984), and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (1979). Ideological
rigidity and power monopoly continue to remain major obstacles to the
development of a democratic polity in the Caspian states.
Economically, too, the Caspian states do not fare well in
the new world. While relatively wealthy because of oil and gas resources, their
GDP per capita (PPP US$) is below the world average of about $7,376.
More importantly, their per capita GDP has declined in the last two
decades or so, while income inequality has increased as has regional and
sectoral disparities. The littoral
states are also only partially integrated into the global economy through the
extractive oil and gas sector, though Russia has the added advantage of being a
big exporter of armaments. Their share of the total imports of industrialized
countries (including oil) is very low, under 0.5 percent, with the exception of
Russia, whose share is comparable to the major Western European economies.
Statistics for their share of the total exports from the same countries is
similarly low. With the exception of Russia again, some 70 to 80 percent of
imports are consumer goods; only 1 to 2 percent is capital goods.
Foreign investment remains miniscule in Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan, and the little capital that has been attracted concentrate in
the oil and gas sector. In Iran, for example, only $400 million in foreign
capital has been invested in non-oil sectors since the revolution. Iran’s
manufacturing value added per capita in 2001 was only $285 (1990 US dollars)
compared to $876 for the developing countries (See IMF 2003 report on Iran’s
economy). Except for Russia, the other Caspian states have no better position
with respect to non-oil foreign investment or the value added in manufacturing
sector. In Azerbaijan, the manufacturing sector has all but vanished. The fact
is that the Caspian states remain undeveloped and largely isolated from the
international non-oil markets. Of all the Caspian states, only Russia can claim
to be sufficiently engaged and developed.
The Caspian states are decades behind in technological development,
despite the fact that in countries like Iran and Russia, the people could have
created a powerful competitive economy. Russia is again relatively advanced in
technological fields but all the other states are decades behind in the seven or
eight key industries of our age: electronics, telecommunications, computer
hardware and software, new materials, biotechnology, civil aviation, and genetic
engineering. The high-technology sector makes up 8 percent of Russia’s
manufacturing exports. For Iran the figure is 2 percent and for Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan 4 percent and 5 percent respectively. Russia spends 1 percent of
its GDP (Purchasing Power Parity - PPP $US) on research and development, other
littoral states much less. For Iran the figure stands at 0.1 percent, for
Azerbaijan at 0.2 percent, for Kazakhstan at about 0.3 percent, and for
Turkmenistan at close to zero. Compare these figures to the figure for South
Korea at 2.7 percent. Figures for internet users are similarly low: for every
1,000 people, 29.3 Russian citizens are internet users, for Iran 15.6, for
Kazakhstan 9.3, for Turkmenistan 1.7, and for Azerbaijan 3.7. Compare these
figures to the figure for South Korea at 521.1.
The Caspian states continues to mismanage their economies, which have
declined relative to the years immediately preceding the Soviet era and
pre-revolution in Iran. Managers are appointed on ideological and relational
bases, not on the basis of expertise or merit. Corruption and rent seeking is
rampant, and the governments dominate and lead the economies at the expense of
the private sectors, except for a few well-connected, often corrupt, wealthy
businessmen. It will take years
before these states can turn their economies and information-processing
capabilities into fields of force for security purposes. Yet unless they mange
to do so in the foreseeable future, the Caspian states will increasingly have to
resort to military expenditures and thus further drain themselves of resources
for economic and technological developments. At present, they spent almost as
much on military as on health care or education. The Caspian states spend
between 3.5 and 4.4 percent of their GDP on education and between 0.6 and 3.6
percent on health care, while spending between 1 and 4.9 percent on military
expenditures.
Socially, too, there are disturbing developments in these countries when
compared to developments globally. Income inequality is widest in Russia and
Iran, where the share of the richest 10 percent is between 10 to 20 times larger
than the share of the bottom 10 percent poor. In Azerbaijan, where poverty is a
more serious problem, almost 10 percent of the population earns less than $2 a
day, and the GDP per capita shrinks 1.3 percent every year. Between 30 to 45
percent of the people in the littoral states live below the poverty line, and
the female share of the total earned income is between 10 and 15 percent. Women
are economically more exploited than men across the states, and in Iran they are
also socially oppressed. The youth unemployment stands at between 20 to 30
percent, and the annual rate of “brain drain” ranges between 2 and 5 for
every 1000 people, Iran suffering the most. The young populations, about 60
percent of whom are below the age of 30, also suffer from the lack of social
recreations. Many are addicted to drugs, particularly in Iran according to
official statistics. Ethnic groups remain restless and some are plotting with
foreign forces for separatist movements. In Kazakhstan, regional disparity is
extreme.
The Caspian states predominantly view their national strength and defense
in military terms, and thus pour a large percentage of their resources into
their military and police sectors. This tendency is partly imposed on them, as
they live in a dangerous neighborhood, but some officials of the governments
actually believe in the use of offensive force and in the liberating power of
violence. While Frantz Fanon, the
Martinican/French revolutionary political thinker, is no longer widely read, his
influence continues: “Violence is a cleansing force,” he wrote in his The
Wretched of the Earth, and it “restores self-respect.” More
specifically, the Caspian states continue to view their security through the old
state-centric lenses. The state remains dominant and unanswerable to civil
society and to private businesses, and individuals are viewed as mere citizens
with rights determined by the state. The rights of the individual or citizen as
self or as members of the human race are peripheral at best.
Significant governance problems exist in the Caspian states. While
parliaments exist, they are often made null and void by decrees or institutional
mechanisms. Public participation in decision-making, particularly in strategic
areas, is even institutionally absent. Almost no partnership exists between the
state, civil society and the business firms, and public policies often lead to
social exclusion rather than inclusion. The lack of participation and
partnership means that little cooperation and coordination exists across
functions and territories at almost every administrative level. No wonder the
Caspian states suffer from social incoherence and political tension. The tragedy
of September 11 has indeed exacerbated the governance problem in the region as
the states have often used the security pretext to further limit freedoms, and
abuse the human rights and human development of their citizens.
Political dissidents are often labeled and dealt with as
“terrorists.”
Not a single Caspian state is among the high human
development category of the UN report on Human Development. Of 175 countries
included in the UN ranking of nations with regard to their achievements in human
development, the Human Development Index (HDI) rank for Russia is 63 and for
Iran 106, with other nations in between these two figures: Kazakhstan 76,
Turkmenistan 87, and Azerbaijan 89. Iran’s situation is particularly
problematic as it is the only Caspian littoral state with a negative GDP per
capita (PPP $US) rank minus HDI rank figure. At –29, Iran is only better than
7 countries in the 175 countries included. The data is a good indication of
state efficiency in managing its resources. A higher positive figure will
indicate a more efficient bureaucracy, while a lower figure shows exact the
reverse. In terms of human rights,
too, the Caspian states fare badly compared to many in the world, with Iran,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan topping the list in the region with the most
negative records.
There is also some good news. The countries’ political cultures are
changing. Foreign policy is increasingly based on national interest, away from
ideological considerations, and increasingly thicker lines are drawn between the
states and disintegrative forces. It is now recognized that new nuclear
proliferators will not be tolerated, and that identification with terrorists is
dangerous. An increasing number of the political elite now sees offensive force
as counterproductive, though the states continue to have a hard time grasping
the value of defensive forces such as economics and technology or human rights
and human developments. The role of government is increasingly being challenged
by a growing number of NGOs and business firms throughout the region, and
humanitarian causes are receiving significant attention. A clear break is
developing between the state and NGOs, and this change demonstrates the fact
that the legitimacy of the state in the region has sharply declined due to its
inefficiency and the lack of transparency and accountability.
There are positive developments in the economic sphere too. The states
have set up an “oil fund” to better manage their budgets and allocate
resources for future development, and their economies are growing while their
macroeconomic environment is stable. With the exception of Russia, Caspian
littoral states as yet have no multinational corporations, but the business
communities are increasingly asserting their relative autonomy from the states.
This is particularly true of the small industrial entrepreneurs in the forefront
of the struggle for modernization of the economies. A few Iranian companies now
operate internationally, and an expatriate counterpart has also emerged in the
West. The internationalization of these companies will help Iran’s economic
integration, technology transfer, capital flow, and foreign partnership. It will
take a while before firms in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan can hope
to achieve international prominence.
There is some good news socially as well. The middle class continues to
remain assertive and demand liberalism and democracy. Compared to the past,
their numbers are large and their quality high in Russia and Iran. They now have
better connections with both the working people and the modern sections of the
upper classes. In other littoral states, however, they remain less significant
but growing as well. It is particularly important to note the progress that
women are making in private and public domains. Their literacy rate and economic
independence has improved significantly in recent years, though their relative
wellbeing is much lower than that achieved by men. In Iran, there are many great
women artists and poets, powerful political voices, a Nobel laureate, an Oscar
nominee, a best-selling author, and a beauty queen. Women’s achievements have
been even more notable in the Russian Federation.
Ultimately, the main source of the Caspian states’ wealth today and
tomorrow is their people. Here too there is good news. Their level of education
and professionalism is fast improving, as is their global reach and awareness.
The literacy rate is well over 75 percent in every state, and, according to the
World Bank, 20 percent of the relevant age group in the Caspian states
participates in some form of tertiary education. There are now millions of
university graduates in these countries, and their size is particularly
expanding in science and technology fields as well as in key social science
disciplines. These achievements notwithstanding, the Caspian states continue to
fail to generate visionary leaders among themselves. Why? In a nutshell, the
problem is rooted in the undeveloped nature of their polity, and largely in the
absence of well-developed political parties.
To conclude this discussion, let me say that the Caspian littoral states
face a multiple of political, economic, social, cultural, spatial, institutional
and international challenges in order to develop their countries. Among them,
and from a security perspective, governance and human development need to
receive the highest priority. The key to achieving success in these areas is to
intelligently mobilize and utilize available resources. Given that these states
are oil and gas rich, their attention must particularly focus on a more
transparent and accountable management of the revenue from these natural
resources. They must translate the finite resources provided by nature into
sustainable development, and this needs to be done as quickly as possible, since
for most states in the Caspian region, oil provides a very short window of
opportunity – in Azerbaijan, e.g., less that 20 years.
It is often the case that a sound fiscal policy, like creation of an
“oil fund,” is viewed as the only proper policy. Yet, transparency,
accountability, a vibrant civil society, and genuine democracy play an even more
important role. It is indeed due to misunderstanding of this aspect of natural
resource management that most, if not all natural-resources rich countries have
less developed societies than nations lacking significant natural resources:
they have greater poverty, income inequality and regional disparity, higher
international debt and dependency, more dictatorship and human rights abuses,
worse governance and legal procedures, and higher military and nonproductive
expenditures. While oil revenue is an additional source of income and disruptive
of traditional authority, it has also led to declining per capita income and
authoritarianism, raising the likelihood for domestic conflicts.
To be sure, there is a political dimension to “resource curse.”
Revenues from the natural resources flow to the state, making it relatively
autonomous from the citizens and the private businesses. They then often pay no
taxes, or pay only negligibly, in such rentier states, and thus these states
receive little clamor for representation from their citizens. The leaders here
find no reason to share power and often refuse to account for the revenues. When
transparency becomes a victim as a free press is suppressed, a host of negative
consequences will follow, including dictatorship and human rights abuses. The
absence of democracy then distorts economic policy and national priorities.
Thus, instead of seeking legitimacy through the electoral process, the rulers
seek it through inappropriate spending. Rent seeking, corruption, debt
accumulation, and inflation can result, leading to political instability and
conflict, which is how the regime of the former Shah of Iran collapsed.
A recreation of the past then becomes a desirable alternative and the
future fails to come to life.
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